The approval nobody priced in
On 5 November, ABB confirmed that China's foreign-investment security review authorities had prohibited SoftBank's acquisition of ABB Robotics' business in China. The buyer is Japanese, the seller Swiss, the price US$5.375 billion, agreed in October 2025. Neither party is Chinese. Yet the deal now turns on Beijing.
The reason is geography. China is ABB Robotics' largest market, and more than 90% of the robots it sells to Chinese customers are made locally. The Financial Times reported that authorities examined whether robotics data generated in China could flow abroad to train AI models. Neither company has given reasons. Both say talks continue, and a carve-out of the Chinese business is reportedly under discussion.
Commercial diligence can be impeccable and still miss the one approval that decides the deal.
Assets now carry passports
Cross-border M&A now requires geopolitical diligence alongside antitrust, tax and financing analysis. The jurisdiction where technology, data, intellectual property, factories or customers sit may matter as much as the domicile of buyer and seller.
This is not a passing spike in regulatory friction. Governments increasingly treat control over production, data and supply as instruments of state power. Investment screening, export controls and emergency powers are the tools. A deal is now reviewed wherever its assets create leverage, and each capital applies its own logic.
Three cases, three mechanisms
Nexperia: one company, three governments. Nexperia is a Dutch-headquartered maker of basic chips for cars and electronics, owned by China's Wingtech. Most of its chips are finished at its plant in Dongguan, China, reported to produce around 70% of group output. In late September 2025, Washington extended export controls to any company at least 50% owned by a blacklisted firm, which captured Nexperia. On 30 September, after executives warned that key technology could leave Europe, the Dutch government took control of the company under a 1952 emergency law. Beijing retaliated on 4 October by barring exports from Dongguan, and carmakers were soon warning of shortages. The Netherlands suspended its order on 19 November 2025; Wingtech is now claiming more than US$8 billion in arbitration. No single government could resolve a crisis that three of them had triggered.
CK Hutchison's ports: the seller's footprint becomes the obstacle. In March 2025, Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison agreed to sell 43 container terminals in 23 countries, including two at the Panama Canal, for about US$23 billion. The buyers: a consortium led by US asset manager BlackRock and Geneva-based shipping line MSC. On paper, a commercial deal between private parties. Beijing saw it otherwise. China's market regulator announced a review, and state-owned shipping group COSCO was later reported to be demanding a controlling role among the buyers. Panama, for its part, saw its Supreme Court rule against the Canal concession in February 2026, and the state took over both terminals. CK Hutchison is now seeking more than US$1.5 billion in arbitration, and the wider sale remains unfinished. Pressure came from two directions at once: where the seller is headquartered, and where the assets sit.
Nippon Steel–US Steel: approval at a price. In December 2023, Japan's Nippon Steel agreed to buy United States Steel, the iconic American steelmaker, for US$14.9 billion. Japan is a close US ally, yet President Biden blocked the acquisition on national-security grounds on 3 January 2025. The Trump administration then cleared it, and it closed on 18 June 2025, but only under a National Security Agreement with the US Treasury. Washington holds a "golden share" with consent rights over the headquarters, plant closures and roughly US$11 billion of committed investment by 2028. The deal survived; part of the buyer's control did not.
Prohibition, intervention and retaliation, conditional approval: three outcomes, none of them visible in a standard data room.
Why Swiss and European mid-caps are concerned
The rules in Europe are tightening too. The EU's revised FDI Screening Regulation, signed off by the Council on 8 June 2026, obliges every member state to screen. It sets a common minimum of sensitive sectors, including dual-use goods, critical raw materials, AI, energy, transport and digital infrastructure. It also captures foreign investors acting through EU subsidiaries. The new rules apply 18 months after entry into force.
Switzerland adopted its first Investment Screening Act on 19 December 2025. It is narrower: only acquisitions by foreign state-controlled investors, in defined areas such as dual-use goods, energy, pharmaceuticals, medical devices and logistics. Its entry into force has not been set; practitioners expect 2027 at the earliest.
The real exposure, however, lies abroad. A Swiss exporter with a plant in China, customers in the United States and R&D in Germany sits inside the screening logic of each. As a seller, your credible buyer pool shrinks. As a buyer, a target with a Chinese or American footprint brings approvals you do not control. In chemicals, agrifood technology, medtech or automation, sector sensitivity compounds the risk.
Before you sign the next deal
1. Map the deal by asset location, not legal entity. For technology, data, IP, manufacturing and key customers: which jurisdiction, which authority, what leverage does it hold?
2. Test the counterparty both ways. Who ultimately controls the buyer or target? Could a state shareholder, financier or partnership (SoftBank's AI ties were reportedly examined) attract scrutiny?
3. Price the carve-out before you need it. If one capital says no, can that business be separated, retained or sold locally, and what does that do to value?
4. Write geopolitics into the documents. Name each security approval as a condition precedent. Set long-stop dates that reflect real review timelines. Agree in advance how far you will accept mitigation such as golden shares or data localisation.
5. Engage early, informally. Soundings in key capitals often reveal more than a filing.
6. Make it a board question. Ask management: which single government could stop this deal, and what would we do then?
If no one in the room can answer that last question, the diligence is not finished.
*This article reflects the author's analysis of publicly available information as of 11 November 2026. It is provided for general information only and does not constitute legal, financial or business advice. Readers should seek professional advice specific to their circumstances before acting on it.*